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Abstract
Given the rich literature regarding lifetime employment, the purpose of this Comment is to
provide an overview of the evolution of this system as well as hlight broader policy implications
for the Japanese economy and society. Part I will provide background information on lifetime
employment including an overview of the main theories that explain the origins of lifetime employment, its relationship to labor laws in Japan, and provide a comparison between employment
systems in the United States and Japan. Part II attempts to answer the frequently asked question,
“is lifetime employment disappearing?” by considering existing quantitative studies as well as
analyzing the possible reasons that aim to explain why the system has or has not changed. Finally,
Part III will provide general comments and broader policy implications.
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INTRODUCTION
In Japan, lifetime employment is a popular topic among
scholars; in fact, “[s]ome researchers regard these employment
practices as one of the most important characteristics of the Japanese
economic system.” 1 Lifetime employment refers to the system in
Japan where both the employer and employee expect that the
employee will work for the employer until retirement age.2
The viability of lifetime employment is particularly relevant
today given the widespread changes in Japan.3 Specifically, Japan is
facing a population crisis and has been experiencing a recession for
years. 4 Additionally, significant changes in Japan’s corporate
governance are likely to impact lifetime employment. 5 As such,
topical questions to consider are whether lifetime employment is

1. Naohito Abe & Satoshi Shimizutani, Employment Policy and Corporate Governance:
An Empirical Comparison of the Stakeholder Versus the Profit-Maximization Model, HI-STAT
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, no. 92, 1-2 (June 2005); see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Lifetime Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate Governance, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 508, 509 (1999) (“[L]ifetime employment for core workers is said to be at the
center of Japanese corporate governance and labor relations . . . and is said to be central
enough to be supported by other Japanese governance institutions, such as crossshareholdings, inside boards of directors and the main bank system.”).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. See infra Part II.B.
4. See Stephen Mulrenan, Population Crisis: Can Japan Lead the Way in Finding a
Solution?, 68 NO. 1 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 33, 33 (2014) (explaining that Japan will have a
“top-heavy population and a diminished workforce, which is unable to support its elderly
citizens”); see also Michael A. Witt, Japan: Coordinated Capitalism Between Institutional
Change and Structural Inertia in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ASIAN BUSINESS SYSTEMS
100-22 (Michael A. Witt and Gordon Redding, eds., 2014) (noting the “shrinking and rapidly
ageing population”).
5. See infra Part II.B. Generally, corporate governance refers to the “system by which
companies are directed and controlled.” See Klaus J. Hopt, Introduction and Questionnaire for
the Country Reports, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A FUNCTIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS 1095, 1096 (Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt eds., 2013).
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changing, and, perhaps more importantly, whether lifetime
employment is still a useful and efficient system in Japan.6
Given the rich literature regarding lifetime employment, the
purpose of this Comment is to provide an overview of the evolution
of this system as well as highlight broader policy implications for the
Japanese economy and society. Part I will provide background
information on lifetime employment including an overview of the
main theories that explain the origins of lifetime employment, its
relationship to labor laws in Japan, and provide a comparison between
employment systems in the United States and Japan. Part II attempts
to answer the frequently asked question, “is lifetime employment
disappearing?” by considering existing quantitative studies as well as
analyzing the possible reasons that aim to explain why the system has
or has not changed. Finally, Part III will provide general comments
and broader policy implications.
I. LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN
Part I will provide a broad overview of the lifetime employment
system in Japan. First, Part I.A. will highlight the main mechanisms
of lifetime employment. Second, Part I.B. will explore the origins of
lifetime employment. Third, Part I.C. will provide an overview of
Japanese labor law and how it relates to lifetime employment. Lastly,
Part I.D. compares employment practices in the United States and
Japan.
A. A Brief Overview of the Lifetime Employment System
“Lifetime employment” refers to the system that emerged in
Japan after World War II where, the “mutual expectation of employer
and employee is that the employee will enjoy continuous employment
until mandatory retirement age.” 7 While long-term employment is
6. See Ryo Kambayashi & Takao Kato, The Japanese Employment System After the
Bubble Burst: New Evidence 3 (COLUMBIA U. CTR. ON JAPANESE ECON. & BUS., Working
Paper No. 268, 2009) (“There are currently lively debates among scholars and policy makers
surrounding the viability of the practice of ‘lifetime employment.’”); see also Hiroshi Ono,
Lifetime Employment in Japan: Concepts and Measurements, 24 J. JAPANESE & INT’L
ECONOMIES 1, 3 (2010) (“Most recently, the debate focuses on the ‘Lost Decade’ of the 1990s
and its impact on the lifetime employment system.”).
7. Curtis J. Milhaupt, Creative Norm Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in
Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2083, 2092 (2001); see also Witt, supra
note 4 (explaining that the retirement age has been increased from fifty-five to sixty).
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found in other developed countries such as Germany, France, and the
United States, it is more common in Japan, and “on average, Japanese
workers stay in the same firm for longer periods than American
workers, and . . . the turnover rate of the former [has been] lower.”8
The expectation of lifetime employment is typically not memorialized
in a contract. 9 While there is a general consensus that lifetime
employment applies most commonly to employees at large
companies, there is some disagreement over whether smaller and
medium-sized companies also use lifetime employment policies. 10
Furthermore, lifetime employment generally applies to white-collar
workers and only sometimes to blue-collar workers.11
Additionally, lifetime employment is reinforced by Japan's
salary structure, which focuses more on seniority than performance.12
Specifically, “semi-annual bonuses, an integral part of the salary
structure, are loosely tied to firm performance and pensions are
generally not portable.” 13 In addition, scholars almost unanimously
agree that “non-standard” workers are excluded from the lifetime
employment system. 14 For instance, part-time employees are
considered non-standard employees and therefore do not enjoy the
8. Atsushi Tsuneki & Manabu Matsunaka, Labor Relations and Labor Law in Japan,
20 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 529, 532 (2011); see also infra Part I.D (comparing the
employment practices in Japan and the United States).
9. See Witt, supra note 4; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 2 (“Lifetime employment is not
a contractual state. . . . The employment contract includes no explicit clause mentioning this
policy, and employers are under no obligation to guarantee employment.”).
10. See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2087 (explaining that lifetime employment covers
employees at large firms); see also Witt, supra note 4 (“[M]ost small and medium-sized
enterprises tended to follow the same basic norm of long-term employment.”).
11. See Milhaupt, supra note 7 (explaining that lifetime employment covers whitecollar firms and most blue-collar workers); see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at
532 (“[W]hite-collar, and at least some blue-collar workers are embraced within the same
system of long-term employment.”).
12 . See Witt, supra note 4 (explaining that the seniority system has not changed
significantly).
13. Milhaupt, supra note 7; see also Andrew Pollack, Japanese Starting to Link Pay to
Performance, Not Tenure, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/02/
world/japanese-starting-to-link-pay-to-performance-not-tenure.html (“Salary depends much
more on how long one has worked for the company than on how much one contributes to it.”).
14. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 8 (“[T]he
literature almost unanimously considers non-standard employment workers outside of the
‘lifetime employment’ system.”); see Witt, supra note 4 (noting that there has been a rise in
non-regular workers who do not have guarantees of lifetime employment); see also Tsuneki &
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534 (“[T]here are many non-regular workers (atypical workers)
such as part-time workers and dispatched workers that are differentiated from regular workers
in promotion, payment, and employment guarantee.”).
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benefits of lifetime employment. 15 Lastly, women historically have
been excluded from the lifetime employment system.16
B. The Origins of Lifetime Employment
There are three main theories that have developed to explain
why lifetime employment emerged in Japan:(1) economics; (2)
politics; and (3) culture and social norms. This Section explores each
theory in turn. While scholars focus on different factors to explain the
emergence of lifetime employment, they tend to agree that the law is
not the sole reason for its emergence.17
1. Economic Theory
Some scholars contend that lifetime employment arose as a
business strategy to incentivize workers to stay at one company. 18
Specifically, lifetime employment “give[s] workers the proper
incentive to invest in human capital” and “encourage[s] skill
acquisition on the part of workers and to maintain a high level of
effort.”19 Generally, both employers and employees are motivated to
invest in training because lifetime employment “gives both sides
reasonable assurance that their investments will pay off.” 20 For
15. For a discussion on the distinction between standard and nonstandard work, see The
Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 8.
16. Akira Kawaguchi & Kimitaka Nishitani, Corporate Governance and the Role of
Women, 39 JAPANESE ECON. 49, 50 (2012) (explaining how women “have been excluded from
the core of the Japanese-style employment system” because they are responsible for most
housework and cannot meet typical work demands); see also Ono, supra note 6, at 6 (stating
how women were historically “systematically excluded from lifetime employment””).
17. See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2093; see also infra Part I.C (explaining that lifetime
employment is not legally mandated).
18. Caslav Pejovic, Japanese Corporate Governance: Behind Legal Norms, 29 PENN
ST. INT’L L. REV. 483, 494 (2011) (“Long-term employment in its present form developed as a
result of economic benefits.”). See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 (explaining possible
economic arguments).
19. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509-10; see The Japanese Employment System After
the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 2 (““[L]ocal knowledge accumulated through collaboration
of workers is often firm-specific in nature, and its value will be considerably lower outside of
the firm. As such, in the absence of the practice of ‘lifetime employment,’ workers will have
less incentive to accumulate such firm-specific human capital.”).
20. Witt, supra note 4, at 11; see also Tomohiko Noda, Determinants of the Timing of
Downsizing among Large Japanese Firms: Long-term Employment Practices and Corporate
Governance, 64 JAPANESE ECON. REV. 363, 368 (2013) (“Unless some degree of job security
is credibly assured, workers will have less incentive to accumulate such firm-specific skills;
thus firms, invest in their reputation of not reneging on implicit contracts by issuing arbitrary
dismissals.”).
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instance, 70.5 percent of employers will provide regular workers with
on-the-job training.21 Similarly,, 57.8 percent of firms implemented
“deliberately-planned” on-the-job training for regular employees but
only 27.7 percent of firms have similar training for non-regular
employees. “” 22 Furthermore, “67.1 percent of firms reported
implementing [off-the-job training] for regular employees” but only
31.4 percent of firms provide the same training for non-regular
employees. 23 Moreover, “the quality and intensity of [on-the-job
training] offered to regular employees is higher than that of [training]
for non-regular employees.”24 Additionally, “employees are willing to
train their own successors if they benefit from lifetime employment
because there is no risk that he will be replaced.”25 In other words,
employees may not share valuable knowledge about the company
without lifetime employment “” because they may fear that their own
job could be eliminated.26
Classical human capital theory highlights the importance of
lifetime employment for ensuring that an “efficient level of
investment in firm-specific human capital.” 27 For a labor market
without lifetime employment, firms will not have the proper
incentives to invest in their employees if they are free to change jobs
after being trained.”28 Consequently, employees are not incentivized
to invest in the company since their employers are also not
incentivized to compensate their employees for their investment

21. Witt, supra note 4.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also Randall S. Jones, Income Inequality, Poverty and Social Spending in
Japan 10 (OECD Econ. Dep’t Working Papers, Working Paper No. 556, 2007) (“[N]onregular workers receive less on-the-job training.”).
25. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 513; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note
8, at 536 (“Such a system succeeds only when workers are offered incentives for making
efforts to accumulate strictly firm-specific intellectual skills including the willingness to rotate
among various types of jobs depending on the economic environment or the process of OJT,
and the willingness of senior workers to accept and train young workers on the job.”).
26. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 2. See
generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1 (explaining firm-specific human capital).
27. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally GARY S. BECKER,
HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
EDUCATION (3d ed. 1994).
28. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 511; see Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at
536 (“[A] competitive labor market does not ensure an efficient level of investment in firmspecific human capital.”).
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effort.29 Although, in a fluid external labor market, “employees could
pay for their general skills themselves . . . either directly, by paying
the tuition for training programs and education, or indirectly, by
accepting a lower wage while they are being trained,” they generally
are ill informed of what skills are required for the future.30 Contracts
also cannot solve this human capital investment problem because
“courts cannot observe the level of human capital investment” and an
employee therefore will not invest in training if he is paid
beforehand.31 The worker also “will be less motivated to invest as he
cannot rely on a firm’s promise to pay later for the same reason of
verifiability.” 32 As such, without lifetime employment, both
employers and employees will underinvest in human capital.33
Some scholars conclude that the efficient level of investment in
human capital due to lifetime employment has enhanced productivity
and helped the Japanese economy grow. 34 Specifically, scholars
contend that this labor system “can be naturally understood as a
superior economic system in adjusting to an uncertain and changing
economic
environment.” 35
Furthermore,
“game-theoretic
contributions argue that labor relations in both the United States and
Japan can be characterized as two possibly efficient equilibria of the
29. See Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note
1, at 512 (explaining that neither side will invest in human capital because the “employer fears
losing its investment if the external labor market is fluid; the employee fears losing his or her
investment if the employer reneges on the promised return”).
30. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 511. See generally Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra
note 8.
31. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra
note 1.
32. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 536. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra
note 1.
33. Interestingly, Gilson and Roe argue that employers “invest in their employees’ skills
not because of the friendly Japanese institution of firms promising their employees lifetime
employment – an institution often viewed admiringly in the American literature. Rather, a dark
and gloomy closing of the external labor market played a key role: Employees cannot change
jobs, because the Japanese external labor market is weak, and deliberately weak.” Gilson &
Roe, supra note 1, at 513.
34 . The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 1
(explaining that there is “some evidence that the aforementioned Japanese employment system
indeed helped Japanese firms enhance their productivity”); see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at
494 (stating that “[i]t contributed to a greater productivity that benefited both the shareholders
and management through higher profits, as well as labor through greater employment
security”).
35. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 531; see also Abe & Shimizutani, supra note
1, at 2 (arguing that Japan’s employment practices “achieve[] an efficient allocation of
resources”).
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same game played by similarly rational players facing different
institutional environments.”36
This Section explored the economic explanation for the
emergence of lifetime employment. It discussed how some scholars
suggest that lifetime employment arose to incentivize workers to stay
at one company and to ensure an efficient level of human capital
investment. In addition, this Section highlighted how some scholars
argue that lifetime employment results in greater productivity and has
helped the Japanese economy.
2. Political Theory
Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe, professors at Stanford Law School
and Harvard Law School, respectively, contend that “lifetime
employment resulted more from political than from human-capital
based economic forces.”37 They rule out a purely economic rationale
because lifetime employment started at a time when there was a labor
surplus, which is counterintuitive since employers could hire
employees for lower wages and did not have an incentive to make
commitments to keep workers for a long time. 38 Gilson and Roe
conclude that politics can explain this contradiction.39 During World
War II, the Japanese government tried to reduce the high turnover rate
by strictly regulating “hiring, firing and voluntary termination.” 40
However, despite government intervention, “skilled workers . . .
remained ready to shift jobs, even illegally, throughout World War
II.” 41 After World War II, organized labor became prevalent,
primarily because the United States occupation authorities
encouraged it.42 For instance, the Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers implemented the Trade Union Law of 1945 “to guarantee[]

36. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 531.
37 . Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 516; see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at 494
(explaining that “[t]he government supported lifetime employment because it contributed to
reducing the tensions between employers and employees”).
38. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 520-21 (explaining that “labor was abundant, people
without jobs starved, and firms could hire at low wages and fire at will”).
39. Id.; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534 (explaining that before
World War Two, the Japanese economy had a classical market system with a competitive
labor market . . . ”).
40. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 520.
41 . Andrew Gordon, THE EVOLUTION OF LABOR RELATIONS IN JAPAN: HEAVY
INDUSTRY, 1853-1955 274 (1985).
42. Id.; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521.
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workers the right to form unions and to strike.”43 This law proved to
be overwhelmingly successful, as union membership increased
thirteen-fold by the end of 1946.44
Given this background, Gilson and Roe hypothesize that lifetime
employment emerged through a “‘deal’ that allowed restructuring
while at the same time bringing social peace, suppressing radical
labor and reducing the chance of a socialist electoral victory by
privileging one sector of labor.”45 Furthermore, on a more local level,
“[w]hen managers sought to rationalize production in a restructured
firm, they might have privileged the surviving employees with
lifetime employment, to reduce post-restructuring labor unrest.”46 In
other words, companies used lifetime employment as a mechanism to
downsize without exacerbating the threat of organized labor, which
had already become a concern.47 Gilson and Roe also acknowledge
that the emergence of lifetime employment could be interpreted in a
more positive manner; managers finally gave in to “some workers’
demands for security . . . that [made] the favored workers more
willing to cede control to management.” 48 They conclude their
argument by explaining that lifetime employment later attracted its
complements, such as seniority wages, main bank monitoring, and
mandatory retirement.49
Curtis Milhaupt, a professor specializing in Japanese law at
Columbia Law School, supports this hypothesis but frames it as a
social norm rather than focusing solely on political motivations.50 He
explains that, although Gilson and Roe characterized the emergence
of lifetime employment as “‘political’ to emphasize the noneconomic
rationale,” lifetime employment should be understood as part of a

43. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521; see also Gordon, supra note 41.
44. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 521; see also Gordon, supra note 41.
45. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 522.
46 . Id.; see also Nobuhiro Hiwatari, The Origins of Lifetime Employment, in
EMPLOYEES’ ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Margaret Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999)
(stating that “[m]anagement then carried out massive layoffs and a purge of radical union
leaders . . . Then to reunite the [remaining] employees, management and new unions
emphasized employment security. . . .”).
47 . Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 522; see also Pejovic, supra note 18, at 494
(explaining that lifetime employment “was allegedly designed as a result of a compromise
entered in to between management and unions aimed at overcoming existing labor problems”).
48. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 523.
49. Id. at 531; see also supra Part I.A.
50. See Milhaupt, supra note 7.
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“larger social pact to bring stability to postwar Japan.”51 He concludes
that new corporate governance norms, such as lifetime employment,
“emerged as both low-cost substitutes for legal rules in the
institutional turmoil of the immediate postwar period and as a fount of
private benefits for the few organized groups left intact after the war
and Allied occupation.”52 Regardless of what label scholars attach to
the theory, this “political” explanation focuses more generally on
Japanese society at the time lifetime employment emerged rather than
on economic factors.
3. Cultural and Social Norms Theory
Some scholars argue that lifetime employment is rooted in
Japanese history and culture. 53 According to this theory, lifetime
employment originates from the Tokugawa period, where “business
entities functioned like family businesses.”54 Companies, or kaisha,
“symbolize[] the organization where people are not united by
contractual relationships, but it includes an element of association
resembling that of a family.”55 Consequently, by operating businesses
like a kaisha, the employer can “achieve[] a greater level of loyalty
between management and employees.”56
Caslav Pejovic, a professor at Kyushuu University in Japan,
slightly alters this argument by focusing on how Japanese culture and
social norms helped make the implementation of corporate
governance practices successful. 57 He argues that lifetime
employment is “perfectly congruent with Japanese social values,” and
therefore was implemented more smoothly because it was “familiar to
employees based on their experiences and education outside the
company.” 58 In other words, while Pejovic does not attribute the
emergence of lifetime employment solely to Japanese culture, he
51. Id. at 2093-94.
52. Id. at 2087.
53. See Pejovic, supra note 18 (explaining that Japanese culture and social norms have
helped with the implementation of lifetime employment); see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka,
supra note 8, at 534 (referring to the cultural theories to explain the origin of lifetime
employment).
54. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 496. See generally Yasuzo Horie, The Role of IE in the
Economic Modernization of Japan, 36 KYOTO UNIV. ECON. REV. 1 (1966).
55. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 497. See generally Horie, supra note 54.
56. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 497. See generally Horie, supra note 54.
57. Pejovic, supra note 18, at 502.
58. Id.
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maintains that it was critical in lifetime employment’s “successful
implementation and functioning in practice.”59
However, many scholars have discredited the cultural argument
because historically, workers have not continuously enjoyed stable,
long-term employment in Japan.60 In fact, workers often changed jobs
after World War I: “Yearly turnover rates of around seventy-five
percent were the norm in most industries during World War I.” 61
Moreover, Tsuneki and Matsunaka point out that “these culture-based
explanations . . .
are
inconclusive
because . . .
lifetime
employment exist[s] in all developed capitalist countries.”62
This Section provided an overview of the three main arguments
that scholars have put forth to explain the emergence of lifetime
employment. First, scholars have provided an economics explanation
that focuses on how lifetime employment resulted in an efficient level
of human capital investment. Second, scholars have suggested that
lifetime employment emerged as part of an effort to stabilize postwar
Japan. Lastly, while some scholars contend that lifetime employment
is rooted in Japanese culture and history, other scholars have
discredited this theory because lifetime employment exists in other
developed countries and was not always prominent in Japan.
C. Labor Law in Japan
Milhaupt explains that Japanese labor law did not necessitate
lifetime employment, but rather that a legal framework emerged to
reinforce the system later on.63 Specifically, “it is unlikely that the
threat of legal sanction was the primary motivation [for lifetime
employment because] [w]hile some cases of abusive dismissal predate
the emergence of lifetime employment practices, the Supreme Court
did not affirm the standards developed in the lower courts until

59. Id.
60. See Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 517 (stating that “the conventional claim that
lifetime employment is rooted in Japanese culture (and needs no more explanation) is not
enough.”); see also Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2087 (discrediting the cultural argument as
misstating Japanese history); Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534-35 (explaining that
“[t]he cultural theories are also questionable from a historical point of view. The customs
discussed did not exist from the beginning of the Japanese economy.”).
61. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 518; see also Gordon, supra note 41.
62. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534.
63. See Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2094 (stating that “lifetime employment is a social
norm that has been sanctioned and diffused by the state”).
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1975.”64 In fact, prior to the doctrine of abusive dismissal, the Civil
Code provided little employee protection and specified that
“employment was terminable at will.”65 However, the labor laws in
Japan have changed since this time to help reinforce lifetime
employment. This Section will provide an overview of labor law in
Japan and how it relates to the lifetime employment system.
Courts generally determine that a dismissal is illegal if it is “not
based on reasonable cause or [is] viewed as improper from the
general viewpoint of society.” 66 Courts will typically find that a
dismissal is abusive unless one of the following situations apply:
(1) a worker [was] incapable of providing service, (2) a worker
[was] incompetent or lack[ed] ability to work, (3) a worker
violate[d] his or her job duties or [was] engaged in misconduct,
(4) there [was] a compelling business necessity such as financial
difficulties, or (5) a union shop agreement compel[ed] the
employer to discharge a worker who [left] or [was] dispelled
from the union.67

Additionally, courts have developed four requirements to
determine whether “there was a compelling business necessity” for a
dismissal.68 The four requirements are:
(1) a reduction of the workforce was necessary; (2) the employer
made a good-faith effort to avoid dismissals, such as using
transfers, temporary closings, and soliciting voluntary early
retirements; (3) the employer established and followed a
reasonable standard for choosing which workers would be
dismissed; and (4) the employer made attempts to explain to the
employees or union the reasons for the dismissals and how they

64. Id. at 2093; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 545 (explaining that “the
Supreme Court finally endorsed the doctrine” in the late 1970s).
65. Samuel Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law:
Reassessing American Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 421 (2014); see also Tsuneki &
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (explaining that “[u]nder the Civil Code, both employers and
employees can terminate this type of labor contract at will with two weeks’ notice.”).
66. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 421; see also Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2093
(explaining that “judicial precedent places substantial constraints on an employer’s ability to
dismiss workers even where layoffs are motivated by economic necessity”); Tsuneki &
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (stating that “[u]nder the doctrine, employers can dismiss
workers only when there are reasonable and objective grounds to do so.”).
67. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 421.
68. Id.; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544 (explaining that the Doctrine
of Abusive Dismissal requires four conditions to be met in the case of adjustment dismissal).
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would be carried out. 69 The doctrine of abusive dismissal has
since been codified in the Labor Standards Act and Labor
Contract Act, which apply to all private-sector employees.70

In addition to the doctrine of abusive dismissal, other Japanese
labor laws provide protection to employees. Specifically, labor laws
“emphasize the protection of employment as its basic objective . . .
[and] explicitly states the need for active intervention by the
government in the labor market.”71 For instance, there are stringent
regulations of private employment agencies. 72 The Public
Employment Security Office, a government agency, has
“monopolized placement and vocational guidance activities.” 73
Additionally, if requested by the employee, the employer is required
to provide a written explanation for why the employee was dismissed
under the Labor Standards Act. “”74 Companies that have more than
ten employees must inform the employees of all rules, including
dismissal rules. 75 Furthermore, “[b]efore implementing a collective
dismissal, an employer must notify a government agency and consult
with a relevant union or employee representative over the reasons for
the layoffs, their timing, the identity of affected employees, and the
nature of any re-employment assistance.” 76 The government also
provides subsidies to certain companies facing financial problems.77

69. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 422; see also Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra
note 8, at 544 (listing the four requirements).
70. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 422 (explaining that “Japan codified part of
this unjust dismissal regime under the Labor Standards Act of 1947”); see also Tsuneki &
Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 543 (explaining that the doctrine of abusive dismissal has been
codified).
71. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552; see also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note
65, at 421 (stating that “[o]ver the past half-century, Japan’s employment law has changed
gradually to provide more protection to employees.”).
72. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552 (explaining that “private employment
agencies had been strictly regulated”); see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards Law], Law
No. 49 of 1947, art. 6 (Japan).
73. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 552; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 6 (Japan).
74. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 423; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 22 (Japan).
75. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 423; see also Rodo Kijunho [Labor Standards
Law], Law No. 49 of 1947, art. 89 (Japan).
76. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 425; see also Koyo Taisaku [Employment
Measures Act], Law No. 132 of 1966, art. 24 (Japan).
77 . Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424-25 (noting the requirements of the
Employment Adjustment Subsidy Program); see also Chad Steinberg & Masato Nakane, To
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For instance, “[t]he Employment Adjustment Subsidy Program
requires that the firms spend this assistance on wage subsidies to
workers on temporary leave, to workers temporarily transferred to a
different company, or to educate and train dismissed workers.”78
Consequently, labor laws and government intervention have
helped to reinforce lifetime employment. Lifetime employment has
also been generally accepted by society because there is a “general
sense among many Japanese employers that, irrespective of the
formal legal regime, dismissals without cause are something to be
avoided, if possible.” 79 As such, employers typically do not view
dismissals as the first option during recessions and financial
difficulties.80 Rather, “dismissals [are] avoided by restricting overtime
work, suspending mid-career hiring, transferring and farming out
workers to related companies, terminating the employment of nonregular workers, and soliciting voluntary retirements by old
workers.”81
D. Comparing Japanese and United States Employment Practices
Many scholars are interested in comparing employment in Japan
and the United States because the two countries “represent[] two
contrasting employment systems.” 82 Notably, many employers in
Japan guarantee lifetime employment whereas “in the United States,
employment is typically at will, although actual tenure is often longlasting.”83 In addition, employees in the United States “have neither
Fire or to Hoard? Explaining Japan’s Labor Market Response in the Great Recession 12 (IMF
Working Paper 2011) (discussing the subsidy program that developed in 1975 in Japan).
78. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424; see also Steinberg & Nakane, supra note
77, at 12.
79. Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 424; see also Kazuo Sugeno, The Birth of the
Labor Tribunal System in Japan: A Synthesis of Labor Law Reform and Judicial Reform 25
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y 519, 523 (2004) (stating that “[f]irms still maintained the policy of
not dismissing core workers as a commitment to the long term employment system.”).
80. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544 (explaining that “[d]ismissing typical
workers was not regarded as the first option employers should take in recessions.”); see also
infra Part II.A.1.
81. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 544; see also infra Part II.A.1.
82. Ryo Kambayashi & Takao Kato, Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security
in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years 1 (Columbia U. Center on
Japanese Econ. & Bus. Working Paper No. 302, 2012); see also Ono, supra note 6, at 23
(explaining that “[c]omparisons of job mobility between these two countries should thus be
understood as a comparison of two extremes.”).
83. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509; see also Henry Farber, Labor Market Adjustment
to Globalization: Long-Term Employment in the United States and Japan 3 (Princeton U.
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explicit nor implicit guarantees of permanent employment and the
corporate governance system rarely involves labor.”84 Henry Farber, a
professor at Princeton University, notes that “[t]he role of ‘life-time
jobs’ has been highlighted as an important institutional, economic,
and even cultural difference between the two countries and it is
worthwhile to understand the degree to which this difference is real
and the extent to which these relationships are changing.”85 Lastly,
scholars are interested in determining whether there is a convergence
of the United States and Japanese employment systems. 86 This
Section will provide qualitative observations as well as an overview
of quantitative studies comparing long-term employment in Japan and
the United States.87
Scholars generally agree that “job mobility is much higher in the
[United States] than in Japan.” 88 Since the 1960s, long-term
employment has been more common in Japan than in the United
States. “”89 Specifically, “in the early 1980s, 74% kept the same job
15 years later in Japan whereas only 48% did so in the United
States.” 90 Interestingly, Ryo Kambayashi and Takao Kato find that
“the job stability gap for core employees between the two nations

Working Paper 519, 2007) (explaining that “most workers find a job . . . that lasts for a long
period of time. . . . ”).
84. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509; see also Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at
347 (stating that “[i]n the United States – absent a constitutional, statutory, or public-policy
provision or ruling restricting the grounds for termination – nothing prevents the employer or
employee from terminating the employment relationship without cause or notice”). There is
some disagreement over whether the United States should “reconsider a rule – the at-will
default – that differs so substantially from the approach taken by most other countries.”
Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 348. However, “[t]he counterargument suggests that the
at-will rule permits greater labor-market flexibility and hence a more efficient productive
economy.” Estreicher & Hirsch, supra note 65, at 348-49.
85. Farber, supra note 83, at 2.
86. See Kambayahi & Kato, supra note 82. See generally Farber, supra note 83.
87. It is important to keep in mind that similar to the quantitative studies about lifetime
employment in Japan, studies about employment in the United States are mixed. See Matissa
Hollister, Employment Stability in the U.S. Labor Market Rhetoric versus Reality, 37 ANN.
REV. SOC. 305, 306 (2011) (explaining that “views on the question of job stability are split”).
88. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Farber, supra note 83, at 2 (stating that “[t]here has
historically been more long-term employment in Japan than in the U.S.”).
89. Takao Kato, The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?: Evidence from National
Surveys and Field Research, 15 J. JAPANESE & INT’L ECON. 489, 498 (2000); see also Farber,
supra note 83, at 2 (explaining “[o]ver the last twenty-five years, job tenure has declined in the
United States while remaining stable or even increasing somewhat in Japan, increasing the
‘tenure gap’ between the two countries.”).
90. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 498.
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remains considerable” at over twenty percentage points. 91
Specifically, the ten-year job retention rates remained at
approximately “70% in Japan whereas “the rates dropped from “over
50% in the 1980s to below 40% [in the late] 1990s” in the U.S.”92
This is particularly interesting because, as Kambayashi and Kato
note, it was the “U.S. with the longest economic expansion [and] not
Japan with [the] “‘Lost Decade”‘ that showed more pronounced
weakening of job stability. . . . ” 93 Similarly, Farber finds that
“[o]ver the last twenty-five years, job tenure has declined in the
United States while remaining stable or even increasing somewhat in
Japan.” 94 Both scholars ultimately conclude that the employment
systems in the United States and Japan are not converging.95
There are some interesting differences when comparing certain
categories of workers in the United States and Japan. First, there has
been relatively little change in the tenure rates for women in the
United States, but this is not so in Japan.96 Farber explains that there
has “been very little movement over time” for females in the United
States, while “[t]here has been a relatively small increase over time
for Japanese females.” 97 In Japan, the fraction of female workers
between thirty-five and sixty-four years old with at least ten-year
tenure increased from 38.4% in 1979 to 44.5% in 2002.98 In addition,
in Japan, “[f]orty percent were female in 1982 and by 2007, female
employees constituted 47 percent of all employees age 18-54.”99
Farber also found that there has been a noticeable increase in
female workers in Japan as part-time workers.100 For instance, “19.3
percent of employed women in Japan worked part-time in 1980 while
91. Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States:
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 8. Ryo Kambayashi is the W.S. Schupf Professor
of Economics and Far Eastern Studies at Colgate University. Takao Kato is an Associate
Professor for the Institution of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Farber, supra note 83, at 2.
95. See id.; Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82.
96. See Farber, supra note 83, at 21; Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security
in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 18 (explaining
that “female employees face higher job loss probability” in both countries).
97. Farber, supra note 83, at 21.
98. Id.
99. See Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 12.
100. Farber, supra note 83, at 21.
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fully 39.7 percent worked part-time in 2002.”101 On the other hand, in
the United States, “22.6 percent of employed women worked parttime in 1981 while 20.9 percent worked part-time in 2002.” 102
Second, Kambayashi and Kato conclude that while “job stability for
mid-career hires and youth employees did deteriorate in Japan over
the last twenty-five years,” a similar decline was not observed in the
United States.103 As such, they conclude that the “job stability gap
between Japan and the United States did shrink over the last twentyfive years for these group of workers.”104
Third, it is generally agreed that there has been a noticeable
increase in part-time workers in Japan.105 For instance, “the share of
total employment (male and female) that is part-time increased from
12.6 percent in 1990 to 19.1 percent in 2001. The comparable figures
for the United States are 14.38 percent part-time in 1991 and 12.96
percent part-time in 2000.”106 As such, Farber concludes that while
there is evidence that “Japanese employers appear to be making
increased use of part-time workers, especially women . . . there has
been no such trend in the United States.”107 However, there is some
disagreement over the prevalence of part-time employment in the
United States, as Hollister finds an “increase over time in part-time
employment, with particularly large increases in involuntary part-time
work.” 108 In sum, there are three salient differences in certain
categories of workers — female workers, mid-career and youth hires
and part-time workers — when comparing employment in the United
States and Japan.
Scholars have found that while “both the United States and
Japan have been faced with similar global competitive pressures,”
employers in each country have responded differently. 109 Scholars
who insist that lifetime employment is not disappearing in Japan have
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States:
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 9.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 10; see also The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra
note 6, at 17 (explaining that there has been a rise in non-standard employment such as parttime workers).
106. Farber, supra note 83, at 21.
107. Id. at 3.
108. Hollister, supra note 87, at 312.
109. Farber, supra note 83, at 23. See generally Trends in Long-term Employment and
Job Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82.
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identified a two-tier workforce with core workers, who benefit from
lifetime employment policies, and peripheral employees, who do
not.110 The second group of employees usually consists of mid-career
hires and younger employees.111 Furthermore, Farber maintains that
the “Japanese labor market is . . . adjusting by reducing the
incidence of ‘life-time’ jobs by increasing the role of part-time
employment.”112
However, Farber contends that a two-tier workforce is not found
in the United States, and firms simply lay off workers.113 He attributes
this difference between the United States and Japan to the lack of
mandatory retirement in the United States, historical differences
between the two countries, and stronger job protections in the United
States.114 Furthermore, “[r]eassignment to other jobs within firms has
not been an important phenomenon” in the United States whereas
employers in Japan “have taken the approach of reassigning
workers.”115 Therefore, it appears that the employment systems in the
United States and Japan remain significantly different and are not
converging as has been previously considered.116
II. LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT MAY NOW BE SHORT-LIVED
Given the changes in corporate governance and the recessionary
period in Japan, many scholars have begun to question whether
lifetime employment is still viable.117 Part II will provide an overview
110. See Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United
States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 23 (explaining that there is a two-tier
structure as a built-in shock absorber); see also infra Part II.A.3.
111. Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the United States:
the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 10-11; see also infra Part II.A.
112. Farber, supra note 83, at 23.
113. Id. But see Hollister, supra note 87, at 308 (stating that “[t]he first is the adoption of
the core-periphery model, in which employers provide greater security for a select group of
core workers while using temporary workers and outsourcing to provide the necessary
flexibility.”).
114. Farber, supra note 83.
115. Id. at 23; see also infra Part II.A.3.
116. There are many other interesting components of each employment system, such as
changes in the quality of work. Farber explains that there is a “concern regarding a decline in
the quality of jobs” in the United States.” Farber, supra note 83, at 4. However, the quality of
employment, as well as many other components of employment, is beyond the scope of this
Note.
117. See Daiji Kawaguchi & Yuko Ueno, Declining Long-term Employment in Japan, 28
J. JAPANESE INT’L ECON. 19, 20 (2013) (noting that “academics have debated whether longterm employment practices have survived through long-term stagnation”); see also The
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of quantitative studies that measure whether lifetime employment is
in fact disappearing as well as address the possible reasons for why it
is or is not changing. First, Part II.A. explores the various quantitative
studies, which are separated into studies that conclude that (1)
lifetime employment is declining; (2) lifetime employment is not
changing; or (3) lifetime employment is not disappearing but faces
major changes. Second, Part II.B. highlights the main explanations for
why lifetime employment has persisted. Lastly, Part II.C. covers the
various explanations for why lifetime employment has changed.
A.

Quantitative Studies

After the lost decade, “academics have debated whether longterm employment practices have survived through the long-term
stagnation.”118 The results of these quantitative studies generally fall
into one of three categories: (1) lifetime employment is declining; (2)
lifetime employment is not changing; and (3) lifetime employment is
not disappearing but faces significant changes. Each category will be
explored in turn.
1. Lifetime Employment is Declining
While there are many studies that explore the demise of lifetime
employment, three especially interesting studies are explored in this
Section. Masahiro Abe and Takeo Hoshi find that, while “it is too
soon to declare the death of lifetime employment system, there [is]
some evidence that suggests the popularity of the practice is indeed
declining.”119 First, it appears that “mid-career hiring, which is not a
usual practice for Japanese corporations, is becoming more
standard.”120 Second, “employment adjustment by means of voluntary
Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that “there is
currently a lively debate among scholars and policy makers surrounding the viability of the
practice of ‘lifetime employment.’”).
118. The Lost Decade refers to the 1990s, when the Japanese economy stagnated. See
Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade 5 REV. OF ECON.
DYMANICS, 206, 206 (2002). See Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 20; see also Ono,
supra note 6, at 2 (stating that “[m]ost recently, the debate focuses on the ‘lost decade’ of the
1990s and its impact on the lifetime employment system.”).
119 . Masao Abe & Takeo Hoshi, Corporate Finance and Human Resource
Management, RIETI DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (Aug. 2004), http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/
publications/dp/04e027.pdf.
120. Id. at 6; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 507
(finding that one of the firms he studied engaged in more mid-career hiring). At the time of
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retirement and dismissal has been increasing after 1998.” 121 Third,
Abe and Hoshi suggest that there are changes in salary structures.122
For instance, “firms that took into account the performance and
achievement of management level employees in wage determination
rose from 55.1% in 1998 to 64.2% in 2000.” 123 Based on the
foregoing, Abe and Hoshi conclude that these fundamental changes
signal a decline in lifetime employment.
Similarly, Daiji Kawaguchi and Yuko Ueno find that lifetime
employment is declining due to the decrease in mean tenure among
workers in Japan.124 This differs from other studies, explored below,
that mostly focus on job retention rates. 125 Kawaguchi and Ueno
contend that the decrease in mean tenure is the “natural consequence
of the low growth rate after the high-growth period ended by the early
1970s, because the Japanese employment system is considered to
foster firm-specific human capital and the lower growth rate
decreases the rate of return to all types of assets, including firm
specific human capital.” 126 Specifically, they find that “[m]ale
workers who were born in 1970 have about 20% fewer years of job
tenure than workers who were born in 1944.”127 In response to the
argument that lifetime employment is only declining in certain
industries or smaller firms, they determined that “male workers in all
industries and firm sizes almost uniformly have experienced declining
long-term employment.”128
In addition, Kawaguchi and Ueno ruled out other explanations
that scholars have argued could account for the decrease in lifetime
employment.129 First, they found that different levels of education and
publication, Masahiro Abe was an academic at Dokkyo University and the Research Institute
of Economy, Trade & Industry (“RIETI”) in Japan. Takeo Hoshi was an academic at the
University of California, San Diego as well as RIETI and the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
121. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 7; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in
Japan?, supra note 89, at 511 (concluding that the firms in the study used an early retirement
incentive plan to induce employees to retire early).
122. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 8-9.
123. Id. at 8.
124 . Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 19. At the time of publication, Daiji
Kawaguchi was an academic at Hitotsubashi University in Japan, and Yuko Ueno was part of
the Cabinet in the Japanese government.
125. See infra Part III.A.3.
126. Kawaguchi & Ueno, supra note 117, at 20.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 21.
129. Id. at 26-32.
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the recessionary period are not major causes of a decrease in the mean
tenure among workers.130 In addition, Kawaguchi and Ueno note that
“this time-series suggests that declining long-term employment is not
a byproduct of a positive change of Japanese labor market that allows
its workers to enjoy more opportunities for voluntary job hopping.”131
However, they do find that the decrease in lifetime employment can
partially be attributed to the increase in nonpermanent workers. 132
They find that the “increase of nonpermanent-regular workers and the
decrease of mean tenure among regular workers [both] reflect the
declining trend of the Japanese employment system.”133
Third, Zenichi Shishido contends that “each Japanese company
is now struggling to find a new direction of corporate governance.”134
He explains that after 1997, “[e]mployees began to feel that the
implicit promise of lifetime employment had been breached or would
be breached.”135 This was particularly pronounced “when some big
companies, including Yamaichi Securities Firm, went bankrupt, and
responding to the pressure of capital markets, many big companies
were forced to lay off employees.”136 In sum, these scholars argue that
lifetime employment is decreasing in Japan as evidenced by changes
in hiring, retirement age, salary structure, a decrease in mean tenure
and a sense among workers that employers were not fulfilling their
promise of lifetime employment.
2. Lifetime Employment is Not Disappearing
On the other hand, some scholars point out that “[w]hile the
rhetoric of ‘the end of lifetime employment’ is presently rampant,
concrete data on changes in traditional employment practices are

130. Id. at 26-27.
131. Id. at 35.
132. Id. at 28.
133. Id. at 30.
134. Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance:
Current Changes in Historical Perspective, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653, 671 (2001). Zenichi
Shishido is a professor of law at Seikei University in Japan.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see also Elijah Brewer III, Hesna Genay, William Curt Hunter & George G.
Kaufman, Does the Japanese Stock Market Price Bank-Risk? Evidence from Financial Firm
Failures, 35 J. OF MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING, 507, 535 (2003) (explaining that Yamaichi
Securities went bankrupt in March 1998).
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relatively scarce.”137 In fact, Michael Witt finds that “tenure lengths
have actually increased over the past decade.”138 In 1998, which is the
earliest date with available data, the average tenure rate was 17.6
years for middle-school graduates, 13.4 years for high-school
graduates, 9.2 years for graduates from junior and technology
colleges, and 11.9 years for college and university graduates. 139 In
2010, the average tenure rate was 18.4 years, 14.8 years, 11.7 years
and 12.8 years, respectively. 140 Consequently, Witt concludes,
“changes have not been as revolutionary as suggested in the early
years of the debate.”141 In sum, Witt argues that lifetime employment
is not declining because the tenure length for groups sorted by
educational level has increased in the past decade.
3. Lifetime Employment is Resilient but Faces Major Changes
The majority view is that lifetime employment is resilient, but
major changes have occurred within the system. For instance, Hiroshi
Ono found that “[a]lthough the population of workers who are ex-ante
covered by lifetime employment may be shrinking, the likelihood of
job separations has remained stable for those who are already in the
system.”142 Specifically, Ono finds that approximately only 20% of
the workforce enjoys the benefits of lifetime employment, which is a
smaller proportion than previously estimated.143 Lifetime employment
is still resilient as evidenced by how “employers prioritize[ ] their
core workers at the expense of new hires” in response to the economic
downturn. 144 Furthermore, “[i]n order to be more flexible and
responsive to changes in the global economy, companies are reducing
their core, and expanding their periphery labor force.”145 Employers
are therefore able to “honor[] the implicit contract of lifetime
137 . The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 490; see also
Milhaupt, supra note 7, at 2118 (explaining that “[l]ifetime employment remains the stickiest
of all the corporate governance norms.”).
138. Witt, supra note 4.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. Ono, supra note 6, at 23.
143. Id. at 2.
144. Id. at 23; see also The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 511
(concluding that the firms in the study “reduced its hiring of new graduates drastically”).
145. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job
Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 23
(explaining that there is a secondary segment of the labor market in Japan).
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employment and protect those who are in the core.”146 As such, Ono
concludes that “[l]ifetime employment is far from dead for those who
are in the core.”147
Similarly, Ryo Kambayashi and Takao Kato conclude that while
lifetime employment is resilient, it “does not mean the complete
rigidity of the Japanese employment system.”148 They find that “job
stability of regular employees eventually fell during the final years of
the Great Recession.”149 Specifically, “the average regular employees
ages 35-39 with 0-4 years of tenure in 1982 had a 63 percent chance
of being with the same employer ten years later (1992) whereas the
average employee in the same age tenure category in 1992 had only a
49 percent chance of being with the same employer ten years later
(2002).”150
Kambayashi and Kato find that the group most drastically
affected by potential deviations from lifetime employment is regular,
female employees over the age of 30. 151 Further, similar to Ono’s
conclusion, Kambayashi and Kato determine that “Japanese firms
honor their promise of job security to the original members . . .
which in turn contributes to the stability of the Japanese employment
system.”152 In other words, employers generally protect the “original
members” who are “typically male regular employees who are new
graduates hires” while the “expansion members appeared to have
served as an elaborate shock absorber.”153
In an earlier study, Kato reached similar results and concluded
that there is “little evidence for serious erosion of the practice of
lifetime employment.”154 While the “evidence points to the enduring
nature of the practice of lifetime employment in particular for prime
146. Ono, supra note 6, at 23; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job
Security in Japan and the United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 24
(stating that “[t]he core segment of the labor market weathered the Great Recession rather
well, continuing to enjoy strong job security, while the secondary segment of the labor market
experienced significant loss in job security. . . .”).
147. Ono, supra note 6, at 23.
148. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 26.
149. Id.
150. Id at 8.
151. Id. at 9.
152. Id. at 29.
153. Id.; see also Trends in Long-term Employment and Job Security in Japan and the
United States: the Last Twenty-Five Years, supra note 82, at 24 (explaining that the two-tier
structure in Japan serves as a shock absorber).
154. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 494.

776

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 39:753

age male employees . . . [t]he burden of downsizing . . . appears to
have fallen disproportionately on young employees and middle age
employees with short tenure, in particular middle age female
employees with short tenure.155 As an example, Kato points to how
“female employees ages 35-39 and 0-4 years of tenure enjoyed an
almost 60% chance of 10-year job retention for 1977-87 whereas they
enjoyed only about 40% of 10-year job retention for 1987-97.”156
Kato investigated three large Japanese companies to highlight
how the trends he identified in his study work in reality.157 One of the
companies, Firm A, is a large manufacturing company, which is well
known both domestically and internationally. 158 Throughout the
1990s, Firm A cut 30% of its workers and accomplished this
primarily by limiting hiring and transferring workers, instead of
dismissing current employees. 159 For instance, Firm A hired 3,000
college and high school graduates in 1990, but, by the mid-1990s,
Firm A only hired between 62 and 482 graduates each year.160 Kato
found that two other firms adopted a similar process of limiting hiring
and transferring employees.161
Each of the firms that Kato investigated downsized significantly,
from twenty-five to fifty percent, yet “no firm used layoffs as a means
to achieve restructuring or downsizing.”162 These firms were able to
do this by using voluntary early retirement plans and inter-company
transfers. Voluntary early retirement plans were appealing, and “each
firm induced a substantial number of early retirements
successfully.”163
Kato further found that employers who were using transfers to
avoid discharging workers would transfer the employee within the
firm, either to a subsidiary or related firm of the company. 164 For
example, in Kato’s study, Firm A transferred approximately 2,000
155. Id. at 495; see also The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra
note 6, at 9 (explaining that the burden was heaviest on female workers over 30 with relatively
short tenure at a large firm).
156. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 495.
157. Id. at 498-510.
158. Id. at 499.
159. Id. at 500-01.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 504, 507.
162. Id. at 510.
163. Id. at 511; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 7 (noting there has been an
increase in voluntary retirement plans).
164. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 501.
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employees to related, as well as unrelated, firms each year in 1995
and 1997.165 Thus, firms have been “downsizing their labor force by
expanding the definition of the firm to include the firm’s subsidiaries
and related firms . . . [thus] [l]ifetime employment with the firm
now often means lifetime employment with the firm and its
subsidiaries and related firms.”166 Rather than viewing this change as
the end of lifetime employment, Kato finds that “both HR managers
and top union officials tend to view the increasing incidents of
permanent transfers in recent years as a necessary modification of the
notion of lifetime employment.”167 It is notable, however, that some
“employees were generally unhappy about the prospect of becoming
employees of somewhat less prestigious subsidiaries and related
firms.”168
Another study noted that lifetime employment continues to be
resilient in Japan because both employees and employers like the
system. For example, Ono’s study used data that both employees and
employers want to maintain lifetime employment as “counterevidence
to the anecdotal view that lifetime employment is a thing of the
past.”169 In a 2007 survey by the Japan Institute for Labour Policy and
Training, “almost 90 percent of companies . . . aimed to maintain
lifetime employment policies in their current or partially adjusted
form.” 170 In addition, a survey in 2010 shows that 60% of new
recruits wanted to stay at the same company.171
The quantitative studies that examine lifetime employment fall
into three main categories. First, some scholars have found that
lifetime employment is disappearing, as evidenced by changes in
hiring, retirement age and a decrease in mean tenure, among others.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 511; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 25 (explaining “[i]n this sense,
permanent shukko [or transfers] may be viewed as an attempt to maintain lifetime employment
system in the increasing volatile economy.”).
167. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 512.
168. Id.; see infra Part III for a discussion of whether this is just a modification of
lifetime employment or a symptom of the decline in lifetime employment, and furthermore,
whether this distinction is important.
169. Ono, supra note 6, at 25.
170. Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 25 (explaining that “survey
results from 1999 show that 60.6% of personnel managers intend to ‘maintain lifetime
employment as much as possible,’ an increase from the 46.8% reported in 1997”).
171. Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Ono, supra note 6, at 24 (stating “[i]n fact, the
support base seems to be increasing. A worker survey conducted in 2004 shows that 78% of
workers are in favor of lifetime employment, an increase of 5.7% from the first survey
conducted in 1999.”).
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Second, others contend that lifetime employment is not disappearing.
Third, the majority view is that while lifetime employment is resilient,
there have been significant changes to the employment system in
Japan.
B.

Non-Quantitative Studies

1. Explanations for Why Lifetime Employment has Persisted
The following Section discusses the rich literature concerning
institutional complementarities in Japanese corporate governance. In
his seminal article, Aoki explains that “corporate governance cannot
be introduced or maintained in either a piecemeal or autonomous way
. . . its effectiveness must be supported by complementary
institutional arrangements. . . . ” 172 Specifically, “the Japanese
employment system . . . is complementary to the Japanese financial
system [] characterized by stable financial corporate grouping, such as
banks and institutional shareholders[,] as stable, long-term suppliers
of capital.” 173 In other words, Japanese companies “obtain funding
from banks, instead of capital markets,” and these banks tend to have
“long-term commitments to firms.” 174
Japanese firms therefore generally operate according to the
stakeholder system where “stakeholders . . . emphasize strategic
interests . . . and are likely to be committed to the long term
interests of the firm.” 175 As long-term investors, “main banks and
silent shareholders support managers’ decisions to maintain
employment, as long as performance ultimately translates into
positive profits – even if the firms are facing performance

172. Masahiko Aoki, The Contingent Governance of Teams: Analysis of Institutional
Complementarity, 35 INT’L ECON. REV. 657, 657 (1994).
173. The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 491; see also Noda,
supra note 20, at 364 (stating that “[l]ong-term employment practices are considered to have
complementarities with the corporate finance and ownership structure, such as the main bank
system and cross-shareholding”).
174. Witt, supra note 4, at 14; Noda, supra note 20, at 365, 370 (noting that the main
banks “comprise the typical Japanese stakeholders”); see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at
3 (explaining that the bank is typically the corporation’s largest lender and stating that “[a]
Japanese corporation has a long-term relationship with a bank. . . . ”).
175. Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 3 (stating
that “[m]any researchers have pointed out that the corporate governance of Japanese firms fit
the stakeholder view of the corporate governance very well. . . . Corporations seem to be
operated in the interests of many types of stakeholders, including employees. . . . ”).
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declines.”176 Tomohiko Noda notes that this stakeholder system is the
opposite of the Anglo-American model, where shareholders who
“emphasize financial interests . . . do not pursue long-term profits .
. . [and a]ccordingly take a relatively dispassionate attitude toward
implicit long-term employment contracts and do not hesitate to
pressure firms to downsize.”177 Therefore, the corporate governance
structure in Japan tends to help reinforce lifetime employment as
opposed to corporate governance in Anglo-American States.178
Additionally, the relative lack of foreign investment has helped
maintain Japan’s form of corporate governance, thus helping to
maintain lifetime employment. Until the early 2000s, foreign
investors were relatively uncommon in Japan.179 In the early 1990s,
the share of foreign ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange was four
percent. 180 The lack of foreign investment helped maintain lifetime
employment because “[f]oreign investors . . . are likely to be strong
proponents of shareholder capitalism; [thus] they are likely to have
little patience for Japan’s existing system, which protects employees’
interests even at the sacrifice of shareholders’ interests to some
extent.”181
Some scholars also argue that the composition of a company’s
board of directors has a direct impact on the viability of lifetime
employment.182 Historically, in Japan “boards of directors were rather
large and primarily occupied by managers chosen from inside the
176. Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that “[t]he
combination of weak corporate governance and long-term finance enables long term
employment. Jointly, they offer at least partial protection against shareholder demands to
improve profitability through layoffs.”).
177. Noda, supra note 20, at 369.
178 . On the other hand, some scholars recognize that “[t]he effects of ownership
structure are difficult to interpret a priori.” Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 13.
Specifically, “[i]f we consider the monitoring role of large shareholders or banks, a company
with concentrated ownership or strong ties with the banking sector is more likely to cut jobs
since strong monitoring forces the company to concentrate on profit maximization.” Id.
179. Noda, supra note 20; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 5 (explaining that “foreigners
increased their share from 5.8 percent in 1980 to 18.8 percent in 2000 and 26.0 percent in
2009”).
180. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 5.
181 . Noda, supra note 20, at 370; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 5 (stating that
“[i]ncreased foreign shareholdings have meant pressure for changes in corporate governance
toward more attention to shareholders’ interests.”).
182. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at
509 (explaining that lifetime employment is supported by institutions such as inside boards of
directors).
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company.” 183 Abe and Shimizutani note that a board with more
insiders will help maintain lifetime employment because “[b]oth
corporate governance theory and macroeconomic theory predict that
companies with fewer outside directors are more inclined to pursue
the interests of their employees rather than . . . shareholders.”184
As a result, “insider managers are less likely to lay off current
employees and instead are more likely to rely on reducing new hiring
to reduce labor costs.” 185 Scholars point out that “[t]his finding is
consistent with the “moral hazard view . . . which suggests that in
firms where employee influence is strong and directors are selected
from among employees of the firm tend to try to provide job security
[.]” 186 In conclusion, many scholars contend that Japanese corporate
governance has helped maintain lifetime employment.
Scholars have set forth a variety of other reasons to explain why
lifetime employment has remained prevalent in Japan. Some scholars
note that because the legal framework reinforces lifetime
employment, it is possible that Japanese courts have helped maintain
lifetime employment. 187 According to the Global Competitiveness
Report, Japan has the lowest score of all Asian countries for ease of
hiring and firing.188 Additionally, Gilson and Roe contend that “the
Japanese “government may have helped to destroy the external labor
market . . . [by] discourag[ing] lateral hiring, thereby helping to keep
the external labor market weak. . . . ”189
Additionally, Witt contends that “the existing system has
enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy, and the will to effect major
changes seems to be weak, not only among people in general, but also
among top managers.”190 With respect to banking institutions, given
how intertwined the institutions’ board of directors, shareholders, and
183. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 5; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 509
(stating that “firms’ board consist of insider-employees”).
184. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 7.
185. Id. at 14; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14 (stating that “Japanese firms tends to be
run by employees for employees. This means that in the inherent conflict over the distribution
of value created in the firm, employees tend to have the upper hand over shareholders.”).
186 . Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Witt, supra note 4, at 14
(explaining that “[i]n effect, Japanese firms tend to be run by employees for employees.”).
187. See Witt, supra note 4, at 7; see also Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 525 (explaining
that “[t]he second hypothesis is that Japanese courts buttressed lifetime employment.”); infra
Part III.
188. Witt, supra note 4, at 7.
189. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 527.
190. Witt, supra note 4, at 15.
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employees are, it is possible that “the high levels of
complementarities in the business system constrain the extent of
possible changes.”191 Witt maintains that this constraint on change is
also reinforced by the fact that the “consensual nature of decisionmaking in the Japanese political economy is prone to deadlock.”192
Relatedly, Witt further explains that informal changes are
infrequent because “such deviant behaviour happens at relatively low
levels, which means that they cannot build up sufficient pressure on
policy-makers to change the formal institutional structure.”193 Lastly,
Gilson and Roe point out “that managers feared that poaching
employees mid-career from other firms risked adversely affecting the
morale of the firm’s existing employees and reducing the
effectiveness of the internal labor market.”194 Furthermore, it has been
argued that lifetime employment has persisted because “managers
attempt to retain labour in order to avoid any sunk costs associated
with human capital investments” and “prefer to maintain existing
employment levels, even in times of recession, so that they have
ready access to a high-quality workforce.”195
2. Explanations for Why Lifetime Employment is Changing
Many scholars point to fundamental changes in Japanese
corporate governance to explain why the current lifetime employment
system is changing.196 Prior to the Lost Decade, “[m]onitoring by the
main bank and other business group members represented the main
mechanism of corporate governance.” 197 These long-term investors
tended to support management’s employment decisions and did not
exert pressure on the company to downsize. 198 However,
“shareholding patterns begin to shift during the ‘lost decade’ of the
191. Id. at 15; see also supra Part II.B.1.
192. Witt, supra note 4, at 15.
193. Id.
194. Gilson & Roe, supra note 1, at 526-27.
195. Noda, supra note 20, at 368 See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1.
196. See Abe and Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that “[f]inancial institutions
have been decreasing their shareholdings, while foreign investors have been increasing
theirs.”); Noda, supra note 20, at 364 (explaining that “[r]ecent changes in bank-firm
relationships and ownership structure seem to affect the employment practices of Japanese
firms. . . .”).
197. Witt, supra note 4; see also supra Part II.B.1.
198. See supra Part II.B.1; Noda, supra note 20, at 364 (explaining that stakeholders
such as shareholders and banks “support implicit long-term contracts that protect employee
interests. . . .”).
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1990s” when “the importance of bank lending . . . declined and
markets . . . bec[a]me more important.” 199 As a result, “[m]any
corporations increased their bond issues in domestic as well as foreign
markets and reduced their dependence on bank loans, which had
previously served as a hallmark of Japanese corporate financing.”200
Further, cross-shareholding decreased from eighteen percent in the
early 1990s to less than eight percent by 2003.201 Additionally, there
was a “sharp decline in proportion held by financial institutions from
34 percent in 1991 to 25 percent in 2001.”202
Furthermore, “[i]ncreased foreign shareholdings have meant
pressure for changes in corporate governance toward[s] more
attention to shareholders’ interests.” 203 The proportion of “foreign
ownership in the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from about 4% in
the early 1990s to more than 18% in 2002.”204 Abe and Hoshi also
find that “firms with high foreign ownership and low bank ownership
are more likely to downsize their workforce.” 205 In addition, they
determine that firms “that show high level[s] of foreign ownership
were more likely to have human resource management practices that
deviate from the traditional Japanese practice.” 206 In sum, these
scholars point to these fundamental changes in corporate governance,
namely the increased prioritization of shareholder’s interests, to
explain changes in the lifetime employment system.
Tomohiko Noda conducted a fascinating study to analyze the
relationship between the rate of employment adjustment and changes
in corporate governance.207 In the study, Noda finds that, “[a]lthough
firms with close main bank ties tended, prior to 1997, to postpone
199. Witt, supra note 4; see also Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 4 (stating that
“[d]eregulation in corporate financing that started in the late 1970s allowed many large
Japanese firms to use capital markets (rather than banks) for their financing.”); Shishido, supra
note 134, at 668 (explaining that after the bubble burst, “Japanese corporate governance was
forced to change”).
200. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 4-5; see also Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at
5 (explaining that “[s]ince the beginning of the 1990s, a weakening in the relations between
companies and their main banks can be observed.”).
201. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 5.
202. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 6.
203. Witt, supra note 4; see also Abe and Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that
since the mid-1990s, “[f]inancial institutions have decreased their shareholdings, while foreign
investors have been increasing theirs.”).
204. Abe & Hoshi, supra note 119, at 5.
205. Id. at 2.
206. Id. at 28.
207. Noda, supra note 20.
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downsizing until they had faced 2 consecutive years of losses, after
1997, they became unable to maintain employment levels for this
long of a period.” 208 Large Japanese firms were able to maintain
employment because of their main bank ties and cross-shareholding,
which sought to “protect firm-specific human capital investments.”209
Noda notes that main banks only began to pressure firms to downsize
when “they face the possibility of there being unrecoverable loan
interest.”210
Ultimately, Noda concludes that the decline of main bank
relationships and increase in foreign investors has had an impact on
the speed of employment adjustment. 211 He contends that the
“reduced function of main banks and the increased influence of
foreign owners have changed the timing of downsizing, so that it
occurs earlier than had been the case before 1997.” 212 In fact, he
found that foreign investors have “started to encourage downsizing,
even in times of positive profits.”213 Therefore, the combination of the
decline of main bank relationships and the increase of foreign
investors has resulted in a faster employment adjustment rate.214
Furthermore, scholars point to changes in the composition of
boards of directors to explain changes in the lifetime employment
system. Abe and Shimizutani note that since the mid-1990s, “an
increase in the ratio of outside directors in board composition can be
observed, though inside directors are still dominant in many
companies.” 215 For example, in 1991, “the median proportion of
insiders among all board members was 74 percent, but the figure
decreased to 67 percent in 2001.”216 Abe and Shimizutani determine
that:

208. Id. at 387.
209. Id. at 364; see also supra Part II.B.1.
210. Id. at 372.
211. Id. at 370.
212. Id. at 365.
213. Id. at 395.
214. Noda also emphasizes that although his study points to “non-negligible changes,”
he does not want to overstate the change in the employment system. Id. at 395. Specifically, he
explains that “[m]any Japanese firms attempt to maintain employment until they have realized
1 year of losses in order to avoid undermining employees’ incentives to make firm-specific
human capital investments.” Id. He also notes that “foreign owners are not always opposed to
the concept of long-term employment.” Id. at 396.
215. Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 3.
216. Id. at 6.
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[T]he higher the share of outside directors, the more likely are
firms with excess employment to implement lay offs and/or use
voluntary or early retirement schemes. On the other hand, firms
with a large number of inside directors are instead more likely to
reduce new hiring to protect incumbent employees.217
These results are “consistent with the stakeholder view of the
firm, which suggests that inside directors are more concerned with
protecting the interests of employees than with profit-maximization as
assumed by neoclassical theory.”218 Therefore, there is evidence that
these fundamental corporate governance changes account for changes
in the lifetime employment system in Japan.
Scholars also highlight a variety of other factors that may be
changing the lifetime employment system. First, there are a variety of
external factors, such as the financial crisis, the aftermath of the 2011
earthquake in Japan, competition from other Asian countries, Japan’s
struggle with the IT revolution, and the population crisis, all of which
might result in drastic changes to systems like lifetime
employment.219
Second, some scholars contend that lifetime employment has
hurt the Japanese economy. Tsuneki and Matsunaka explain that
“[c]ritics have pointed to the big efficiency losses associated with a
labor market that cannot adapt quickly to changing demands for its
products.” 220 However, Tsuneki and Matsunaka contend this
argument is not particularly persuasive because it “is unable to
explain why post-war Japan succeeded economically at least until the
1980s.”221
Third, dramatic technological improvements can help to explain
changes in Japan’s employment system. Given that the value of
lifetime employment is partially found in the “accumulation of firmspecific knowledge in the long-run, it is more effective in an
economic environment growing at a stable rate and with relatively
217. Id. at 4.
218. Id. at 15; see also supra Part II.B.1.
219. Witt, supra note 4, at 15-16; see also Mulrenan, supra note 4, at 33 (explaining that
“[t]here is a need, therefore, for a boost to both the population as a whole and the workforce in
particular, and it is becoming increasingly apparent that women are crucial in both these
areas.”).
220. Ono, supra note 6, at 1. But see Abe & Shimizutani, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that
some researchers argue that Japan’s employment system achieves an efficient allocation of
resources).
221. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 530.
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small technical changes.” 222 Consequently, Tsuneki and Matsunaka
suggest that the employment system needs to change because new
technologies have resulted in the need to “restructure existing
industries and develop new industries” which requires “the migration
of the labor force from old to new businesses and industries.”223
Fourth, while labor law has been cited as a reason for lifetime
employment’s persistence, the law does not require long-term
employment contracts. 224 In fact, Japanese labor law “allows for
various types of labor contracts.”225 Furthermore, the Labor Standard
Law was revised in 1998 to allow Japanese companies to write up
multi-year fixed term contracts.226 Therefore, Kambayashi and Kato
maintain that, “the 1998 revision of the Labor Standard Law is
potentially a cause for the weakening of the ‘lifetime employment’
system.’”227
Lastly, there are changes to employment and working conditions
that may be adding to the impetus for change. For instance, the “wage
payment system based on seniority is also being reformed to reflect
performance measures more directly.”228 Tsuneki and Matsunaka also
note that “Japanese labor law has recently begun to emphasize the
activation of the external labor market by the deregulation of the
private employment agency business and public support to the
vocational training provided to the unemployed.”229 This could have a
large impact on the viability of lifetime employment because these
changes open up the labor market and, as Gilson and Roe explain, a
closed external labor market reinforces the norm of lifetime
employment. 230 Another explanation points to changes in
subsidization policies, where, instead of giving subsidies to industries
facing economic difficulties, there is a changed “subsidization policy
related to newly created industries such as those pertaining to
information, environment, medicine and welfare industries. . . . ”
222. Id. at 539.
223. Id. at 555.
224. Id.
225. Id.; see also supra Part I.C.
226. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 5. Prior
to this revision, companies had to “choose between indefinite contracts . . . and fixed-term
contracts of one year or less [which] . . . allegedly facilitated Japanese firms to hire more
workers under indefinite contracts.” Id.
227. The Japanese Employment System After the Bubble Burst, supra note 6, at 5.
228. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 555; see also supra Part II.A.
229. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 555-56.
230. See supra Part I.B. See generally Gilson & Roe, supra note 1.
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which is a significant departure from the subsidization policies that
helped to maintain lifetime employment in existing industries.231
III. THE END OF LIFETIME EMPLOYMENT? NOT IN MY
LIFETIME
A. Lifetime Employment is Changing But Not Disappearing
A thorough examination of lifetime employment indicates that
the system is changing.232 In many studies, scholars argue that even
though the number of workers who enjoy lifetime employment is
decreasing, the system is in fact not disappearing because employers
are honoring existing promises with core workers.233 Hypothetically,
however, if the number of employees who enjoy lifetime employment
is decreasing now, this likely means that the system will become less
prevalent in the future..
Currently, lifetime employment only applies to twenty percent of
the working population in Japan.234 Scholars generally agree that the
recession hit younger workers the hardest, and consequently, lifetime
employment is increasingly not applying to them.235 If graduates are
entering the workforce without the promise of lifetime employment,
this must necessarily mean that as the population ages, fewer workers
will be part of the lifetime employment system. This would therefore
indicate that lifetime employment is changing and will decline in the
future.
Furthermore, the reasons that scholars have set forth to explain
the changes in lifetime employment are persuasive. First, the changes
in corporate governance in Japan support the idea that lifetime
employment is changing.236 The strength of the main bank and the
decline of cross-shareholding, combined with an increase in foreign
influence and the proliferation of the use of “outside” board of
directors, help to explain why companies are more unwilling to
commit to lifetime employment.237 In addition, there have been major
changes in Japanese society, such as the population crisis and
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 556; see also supra Part I.C.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
Ono, supra note 6, at 2.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.
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recession, which necessitate a change in the employment system.238
This, however, does not necessarily mean that lifetime employment
will disappear altogether.
B. Policy Implications
Ultimately, the focus on whether the system is disappearing
seems misplaced. Scholars and policy-makers should focus more on
the broader societal and economic implications of changes in the
employment system generally, without regard to whether it fits into
the mold of the lifetime employment system. Japan is experiencing a
severe population crisis with a drastically increasing aging population
and a decreasing working population.239 Consequently, policy-makers
are becoming more concerned about the aging population and its
effect on society, for example as it relates to pension systems. 240
Therefore, instead of focusing on the viability of lifetime
employment, policy-makers and scholars should focus on figuring out
the best employment system for society in Japan today. Since the
“Japanese labor market [now] has a dual nature” with regular and
non-regular workers, there should be an emphasis on how to make
non-regular workers more productive and efficient for the
economy. 241 In addition, as Stephen Mulrenan explains, “[T]he
Government is not doing anything to encourage a mid-career job
market. It needs to introduce policies that allow companies to shed
excess labour when they don’t need it, and hire when they do need
it.”242
Furthermore, the emphasis on lifetime employment has hurt
female workers and younger workers more acutely. 243 Scholars
238. See supra Part II.C.
239 . See Mulrenan, supra note 4; see also Hamid Faruqee & Martin Mühleisen,
Population Aging in Japan: Demographic Shock and Fiscal Sustainability (IMF Working
Paper No. 01/40, 2001) (“[B]y 2025, one elderly person will fall on roughly two persons of
working age, which will leave Japan with a significantly higher old-age dependency ratio than
any other country in the industrialized world.”).
240 . See Mulrenan, supra note 4; see also Maxime Fourgère & Marcel Mérette,
Population Ageing and Economic Growth in Seven OECD Countries, 16 ECON. MODELLING
411, 420 (1999) (“[P]opulation ageing puts upward pressure on wage income taxes . . .
because there are fewer workers to finance public pension systems and tax bases thus
diminish.”).
241. Tsuneki & Matsunaka, supra note 8, at 534; see also supra Part I.D.
242. Stephen Mulrenan is a journalist based in Hong Kong. See Mulrenan, supra note 4
at 37.
243. See supra Part II.A. See generally Kawaguchi & Nishitani, supra note 16, at 49.
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generally agree that female workers have historically been excluded
from the lifetime employment system.”244 In fact, Ono explains that
“the lifetime employment system presumed a complete specialization
between the sexes with one spouse fully committed to market work
and the other devoted to non-market work.” 245 Adhering to this
gendered practice, however, is problematic given the diminishing
workforce in Japan.246
Encouraging more women to work would be a simple and
obvious way to help increase the workforce population in Japan.247
Some contend that this is easier said than done because “it may
require a paradigm shift in the cultured norms and mentality among
Japanese employers and workers in order to achieve a better balance
between work and family in the long run.”248 Still, extending more
favorable employment options to women can help to encourage midcareer hires and provide more flexibility in hiring, which generally
would “enable women who leave the workforce to start their families
to more easily come back into meaningful jobs.’”249
In addition, employers have tried to maintain lifetime
employment by cutting back on hiring recent graduates.250 As such,
this emphasis on honoring lifetime employment promises has
disproportionately burdened younger generations. Consequently,
lifetime employment has created a “serious youth unemployment
problem.”251 For instance, “the unemployment rate in Japan has risen
most rapidly for those aged 15–24 in the 1990s.” 252 Additionally,
Kato notes that, “the firm’s labor force is aging rapidly, which
weakens the dynamism of the organization.”253
The emphasis on lifetime employment is exacerbating the
consequences of an aging population in Japan. Fewer graduates are
able to meaningfully join the workforce while older generations
continue to work.254 Consequently, desperate attempts to maintain the
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
Part II.A.
252.
253.
254.

See generally Ono, supra note 6; Kawaguchi & Nishitani, supra note 16.
Ono, supra note 6, at 25.
See Mulrenan, supra note 4 at 33-34; see also sources cited supra note 245.
See Mulrenan, supra note 4 at 33; see also sources cited supra note 245.
Ono, supra note 6, at 25. See generally Mulrenan, supra note 4.
See Mulrenan, supra note 4 at 37. See generally Ono, supra note 6.
See supra Part II.A.
The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 511; see also supra
The End of Lifetime Employment in Japan?, supra note 89, at 511.
See id.
See supra Part II.A.
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lifetime employment system have resulted in hurting younger and
female workers, which may be the key to mitigating the aging
population problem. Therefore, while lifetime employment has been
and continues to be an important institution to study, scholars and
policy-makers should focus on making sure that fundamental changes
in the employment system help mitigate societal and economic
problems in Japan.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has provided an overview of the lifetime
employment system and has attempted to answer the question: is
lifetime employment disappearing. While lifetime employment has
changed significantly, this does not necessarily mean that the system
will disappear altogether. Ultimately, however, policymakers and
scholars should focus less on whether lifetime employment is
disappearing and more on how the employment system can be
changed to better fit Japan’s economy and society today.
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